Iran is dangerously rational

We’ve been here before. Iran has been here before. In 2020 its most senior IRGC commander, Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a US air strike on his convoy as they drove out of Baghdad airport. Soleimani was a much mythologized figure across the Middle East, famed for his ability to direct Iran’s regional proxies to do Tehran’s bidding. The world held its breath in anticipation of a terrifying response, a global war, commensurate with the purple prose coming out of Tehran’s military and political organs. And yet not a huge amount happened, save for a few desultory missiles being shot into the middle distance of northern Iraq. And the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane by the IRGC. 

Will something similar play out following Israel’s missile killing of Mohammad Reza Zahedi, commander of Iran’s Quds force?

The world has changed dramatically since 2020. The war in Ukraine has pushed Iran closer to Russia, building on already strong ties forged in the defense of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in that country’s brutal civil war. Increasing energy exports overland to China have given Tehran economic breathing space, too. 

Before October 7, as Israel normalized ties with Arab states, coalescing around the notion that the region’s real threat came from Tehran not Tel Aviv, Iran was in real danger of isolation. The war in Gaza has changed that, wrestling back the narrative to Tehran’s dubious claim to stand for the oppressed peoples of the Middle East (read Palestine), and allowing the Islamic Republic to flex its muscles in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Gaza with brutal consequences. Iranian diplomats at Davos were cock-a-hoop with their rediscovered influence across the Middle East, elated at the fact that Arab leaders now found themselves on the wrong side of the street.

Iran may well feel emboldened by deepening ties with Beijing and Moscow. It might also be buoyed by having recaptured the hearts and minds of Arab nations, and it might possibly be more secure at home, having viciously beaten the protest movement into submission. 

But the media narrative of an impetuous and cavalier regime flying by the seat of their robes doesn’t tell the whole story. Yes, Iran has a history of assassinating dissidents abroad, for which they have rightly been sanctioned and censured. Yes, Iran directs its proxies across the region to attack western and Israeli interests, which elicits military and diplomatic responses. But the Islamic Republic of Iran has a chillingly pragmatic streak which allows it to partner with whomsoever it wishes so long as that furthers its goals. Tehran’s strong relations with Russia and China, neither of whom are dear friends of their own Muslim minority populations, give lie the claim that Iran stands for oppressed Muslims around the world. 

Tehran also bought weapons from Israel during the war with Iraq in the 1980s. Iran may be hardline, in some respects, but it won’t act in a manner which threatens the greater good, as they see it. And the greater good is twofold: stability at home and secured hegemony in the region (most importantly this means effective control of Iraq). These are Tehran’s red lines. In the region, much of Iran’s clout rests on their ability to control a web of proxy forces from Iraq to Syria to Lebanon to Yemen. A regional war in which Iran must deploy these proxy groups at full tilt threatens these crucial pillars of their security architecture.

Iran is a far more rational actor than is often acknowledged. It acts in a calibrated manner according to an entrenched set of strategic goals. And it is for these reasons that I think Iran will refrain from a direct, spectacular attack at western or Israeli interests, despite the rather overheated warnings of many security experts in the western press at the moment. 

Iran will continue their policy of using proxies to mount tactical attacks where possible and effective. But the Islamic Republic neither wants nor can afford a large-scale war. Khamenei has said as much publicly and privately. That logic holds true today, even if its practical application has been sorely tested by Monday’s attack. Yet there’s no doubt that Netanyahu and Israel are stretching Iran’s patience close to its limit. Gambling that your adversary doesn’t want a war while goading them into one is not without its risks.

This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.