The meaning of strengthening ties between Russia and North Korea

On July 27, while commemorating the seventieth anniversary of what North Korea perversely terms its “victory” in the Korean War, Kim Jong-un proudly gave a guided tour of his intercontinental ballistic missiles, drones and missile engines. The lucky visitor was none other than Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu. Later that day, Shoigu stood next to the Supreme Leader as they watched North Korea’s rockets paraded across Kim Il-sung Square.

Now it seems that Shoigu’s visit — the first time a Russian defense minister had come to North Korea since the collapse of the Soviet Union — has paid off. On Tuesday, it was reported that Kim Jong-un is preparing to travel to Russia to meet Vladimir Putin to discuss the sale of weapons.

Just like his father, the paranoid Kim Jong-un does not like flying, nor leaving his country. In February 2019, he endured a two-and-a-half-day journey on a bullet-proof train from Pyongyang to Hanoi to meet Donald Trump, only to come back empty-handed. Four years later, Kim will want to make sure the armored train journey to the Russian port city of Vladivostok is a success. If Kim does visit Putin later this month, a deal — with weapons, food, information and cash all on the table — seems likely.

The groundwork for the talks has been laid for some time. Over the past year, North Korea has been vocal in its support for its northern neighbor. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Pyongyang repeated Russia’s mantra that the US was the “root cause” of the war and the North Korean Foreign Ministry recognized the secessionist pro-Russian republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Relations between the two countries warmed considerably.

But until now both North Korea and Russia have vehemently denied that they have been engaged in any kind of arms exchange. With this potential summit, that seems set to change. There appears to be a growing willingness on both sides to admit that their relationship is more than just about ideological camaraderie.

The benefits for both sides are clear. For all the regime’s ability to evade sanctions, the North Korean economy remains cash-strapped. While Moscow, now bereft of friends worldwide, is desperate for weapons to continue its fight against Ukraine.

North Korea did not always view its Russian friend so positively. Much to Pyongyang’s ire, the Soviet Union pressured North Korea into joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, on the condition that the Soviet Union would provide it with light-water reactors. In the end, these reactors failed to materialize. And Moscow at the end of the Cold War viewed Pyongyang as little more than a financial burden. Times have certainly changed for it to consider buying North Korean munitions, which are far from state-of-the-art.

In return, Kim Jong-un will have hope to gain sophisticated technology for satellites and nuclear submarines, allowing him to continue moving down his weapons wish-list. Kim will likely obtain food assistance as well, given how badly the North Korean economy is doing, and the impact that has on its people. Russia may also offer weapons-related information and advice, in a situation reminiscent of the early Cold War years when North Korean scientists were invited to the Soviet Union to gain nuclear know-how.

The motivations behind Moscow’s recent maneuvers towards Pyongyang — and vice versa — remain predominantly practical. This is an unholy transaction between two rogue states seeking to present a united front against their common nemesis of the United States. North Korea is certainly no stranger to the logic of transactional exchanges, especially given its past involvement in clandestine nuclear proliferation networks involving Libya, Syria, Iran and Pakistan.

Time will tell whether Russia’s suggestion to hold trilateral military drills with North Korea and China actually bears fruit. Nonetheless, this very possibility highlights how the three states are determined to present a counterweight, even if only on the surface, to the US’s military exercises with South Korea and Japan.  

Vladivostok will not be like the US-North Korean negotiations in Singapore. If the Kim-Putin meeting does go ahead — and we should be prepared for there to be hurdles en route to any final talks — Putin will not be able to give his North Korean counterpart a tour of the botanical gardens or a presidential suite at the St. Regis Hotel. But he will be able to offer money, strategic insight, and solidarity. And for a North Korea still set on building its nuclear arsenal, that will make the summit far more worthwhile.

This article was originally published on The Spectator’s UK website.