Facebook
X
LinkdIn
Copy Link
As the world enters a new era of great power competition, countries are arming themselves at a rate unseen since the end of the Cold War. The war in Ukraine, China’s increasing belligerence and angst over rogue states like Iran and North Korea are driving defense spending and weapons purchases the world over.
Amid all this, the United States does not have the luxury of being too picky as to who among its friends gets the weapons they need to defend themselves. Nor can Washington continue to avoid drastic reforms to its arms export controls to face the challenges of the twenty-first century.
Standards are necessary — they are what should set America apart — but they must not become so onerous that the security of the US and its partners suffer. What makes the United States a leader is in part its commitment to human rights, and that commitment must be maintained. If a country’s military is known to be committing gross violations of human rights, for example, then it should not receive US weapons. Five successive presidents from both parties — Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden — have maintained that human rights must be considered before any weapons can be sold. Strictness has varied, but the underlying commitment has remained. There’s also the Leahy Law, which prohibits the use of government funds to support forces that have been implicated in gross violations of human rights.
Yet the recently introduced Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms Exports Act of 2023 (Safeguard Act) goes far beyond human rights. It would mandate that the status of democracy in the purchasing country be considered before any arms contract can be completed and that Congress have the chance to override any sale. Currently, statutory law in the form of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) does not require that democracy be considered for traditional arms sales to a foreign country. Presidential administrations, including both Obama in 2014 and Biden in 2023, have stated unilaterally that they would take it into account before authorizing sales, but the Safeguard Act would make this law. While the president could override any congressional resolution against a particular sale due to a country’s failure to meet democratic standards, the new scrutiny is still problematic.
The Act states that the US must “consider the extent to which the government of the foreign country… supports democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary.” This is both overly broad and precisely not what the US should be doing. While it is generally right to describe the current global contest as between democracy and autocracy, that dichotomy can be overdone. It is really a competition between those powers that want to seize control of (or destroy) the US-led global system and those that want to maintain it.
The spread of democracy is a net good for the United States, and is a core plank of Washington’s foreign policy. Democracies rarely find themselves at war with one another, and are also less likely to engage in expansionism and unnecessary conflict. That is good for global security, and it is good for America. Nonetheless, Washington should not freeze out or ostracize every non-democratic or partially democratic country for those characteristics alone. That is a one-way street to losing influence against China. Like it or not, many countries across the globe are not democratic. If an autocratic power — like Saudi Arabia, Egypt or the UAE — is willing to be a US friend, Washington should not place undue obstacles in its path, including over the sale of arms (unless, of course, they continue to perpetrate human rights abuses).
Arms sales are also an important foreign policy instrument for the US, and in 2022 were up nearly 50 percent. By supporting the forces of allied and friendly countries, the US both creates goodwill with them and strengthens their resilience in the face of adversaries such as China. Goodwill is critical when the US is in a bind — such as facing high energy prices — and needs to ask a country for help. Testy relations produce bad results, like the Saudis cutting oil production to raise prices. Creating resilient friends also multiplies America’s strength vis-à-vis its foes. If Iran looks West and sees a well-armed Riyadh, it will be less likely to make a reckless move.
Benefits also accrue with regard to interoperability between allies. If the US and Poland both operate the M1 Abrams main battle tank, for example, it will make for easier interconnectivity and a simpler logistics chain should a conflict break out in Europe. Finally, maintaining robust arms sales bolsters the defense industrial base at home, which is particularly important given the rather poor shape it is in today.
It is important to understand that the US is not the only seller in the arms market. What the US refuses to sell, China, Russia and Iran will step in to fill the void. In some cases that is inevitable: the US will not and should not sell arms to serial human rights abuses, even if China will. In other cases, however, Washington should do what it can to meet demand when involving partners and allies. These countries will get the arms they want, and it is usually better that they come from the US — which can at least impose some restrictions on use — than from China or the like.
Maintaining dominance in the market also necessitates reforms to how the US exports arms, particularly regarding codevelopment of systems and technology transfers. The AUKUS deal, for example, will require unparalleled technological cooperation if it is to work. AUKUS comes in two phases. Pillar I is the big-ticket submarine portion, where Australia will purchase up to 13 nuclear-powered subs. Pillar II, while less well-known, is critical in its own right, featuring joint development of AI technology, quantum computing, hypersonics, counter-hypersonic capabilities, and more. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations as it stands today is a major barrier to both phases. If Congress cannot enact reforms loosening restrictions on the transfer of technology and technological cooperation with allies like Australia and the United Kingdom, then Washington will be at a real disadvantage in its competition with China.
The poster child for burdensome export restrictions was the F-22 Raptor stealth air superiority fighter. Procurement for the US Air Force was supposed to be 381 jets, but due to budget shortfalls, just under 200 were produced. Japan had indicated it would be interested in purchasing the F-22 to fulfill its air superiority fighter needs, an order that could have brought the price down (due to economies of scale) and potentially allowed the US to buy more at a later date as the production line would have remained open. Instead, strict export rules including an explicit ban on exporting the F-22 made any sale impossible, and production ceased after the last US aircraft left the factory.
There is a caveat worth noting regarding technology transfers, however. Such cooperation should only be carried out with the closest and most trustworthy allies — of which Australia, the UK, and Japan are included. As things stand today, an AUKUS-style technology transfer should not, for example, be pursued with India, which despite being a partner of the US, is not a formal ally and is not firmly in the American camp.
As the twenty-first century’s great power competition heats up, continued American dominance in the arms market with friendly nations will be a critical component of maintaining the US’s broader global dominance. It will not be an easy needle to thread: sales to less than ideal partners may be necessary, and technological cooperation with close allies will require drastic reforms. Nonetheless, failure to thread the needle threatens serious consequences for global security.
